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Nach dem Tod von Gisulf II. wird sein Sohn Liutprand Herzog von Benevent. Seine Mutter Scauniperga übernimmt bis die Regentschaft. Diese Kategorie enthält Artikel, die wichtige Themen und Ereignisse behandeln, welche mit dem Jahr in Zusammenhang stehen. Die einzelnen Themen. Börßum - Kissenbrück - Neindorf - Wolfenbüttel und zurück. Fahrtnummer. Verkehrsbeschränkung. Nr Haltestelle aus Richtung Braunschweig. Die Bus Linie (Richtung: Darmstadt Ludwigshöhstraße) fährt von Frankfurt (main) flughafen Terminal 1 nach Darmstadt Ludwigshöhstraße und hat Bus Linie Planabfahrtszeiten für die kommende Woche: Betriebsbeginn um und Ende um Kommende Woche and diesen Tagen in Betrieb. Bitte unter den Rubriken Ereignisse/Geboren/Gestorben eintragen. Weblinks. Eintrag in der deutschsprachigen Wikipedia zum Thema "". Bedingungen für Vollstreckungsbeginn. (1) Ist die Geltendmachung des Anspruchs von dem Eintritt eines Kalendertages abhängig, so darf die.
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Monthly Newsletter. I accept the Terms and Privacy Policy. Email address. None IED Components Ban All Member States are required to prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of explosive materials, explosive-related goods and related technology from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item s will be used, or a significant risk they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices.
None Work and mandate of the Committee The Committee comprises all 15 members of the Security Council and makes its decision by consensus.
Further information on measures Arms Embargo The Security Council first imposed a general and complete arms embargo on Somalia on 23 January with the adoption of resolution IED Components Ban By resolution , the Security Council decided that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of explosive materials, explosive-related goods and related technology to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item s will be used, or a significant risk they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices.
Somalia: summary of listing criteria Criteria Relevant Resolution Engaging in, or providing support for, acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia, including acts that threaten the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, or obstruct, undermine or threaten the Federal Government of Somalia, AMISOM or UNSOM by force Paragraph 8 a of resolution ; Paragraph 1 a of resolution ; Paragraph 1 and 3 of resolution ; Paragraph 43 a of resolution ; Paragraph 42 and 43 of resolution Acting in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia or as having acted in violation of the arms resale and transfer restrictions Paragraph 8 b of resolution ; Paragraph 1 b of resolution ; Paragraph 43 b of resolution Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia Paragraph 8 c of resolution ; Paragraph 1 c of resolution ; Paragraph 43 c of resolution Recruiting or using children in armed conflicts in Somalia in violation of applicable international law by political or military leaders Paragraph 1 d of resolution ; Paragraph 43 d of resolution Violating applicable international law in Somalia involving the targeting of civilians including children and women in situations of armed conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual and gender-based violence, attacks on schools and hospitals and abduction and forced displacement Paragraph 1 e of resolution ; Paragraph 43 e of resolution Engaging in the export or direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia Paragraph 2 a of resolution Engaging in any non-local commerce via Al-Shabaab controlled ports which constitutes financial support for a designated entity Paragraph 2 b of resolution Planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence Paragraph 50 of resolution Set out in paragraph 4 of resolution and paragraph 41 of resolution Paragraph 8 a of resolution ; Paragraph 1 a of resolution ; Paragraph 1 and 3 of resolution ; Paragraph 43 a of resolution ; Paragraph 42 and 43 of resolution Paragraph 2 c of resolution ; Paragraph 44 of resolution It is important to ensure that the provisions concerning the interchange fees to be paid or received by payment service providers are not circumvented by alternative flows of fees to issuers.
When calculating the interchange fee, for the purpose of checking whether circumvention is taking place the total amount of payments or incentives received by an issuer from a payment card scheme with respect to the regulated transactions less the fees paid by the issuer to the payment card scheme should be taken into account.
Payments, incentives and fees considered could be direct i. In checking whether circumvention of the provisions of this Regulation is taking place, issuers' profits resulting from special programmes carried out jointly by issuers and payment card schemes and revenue from processing, licensing and other fees providing revenue to payment card schemes should, in particular, be taken into account.
As appropriate, and if corroborated by further objective elements, the issuance of payment cards in third countries could also be taken into account when assessing potential circumvention of this Regulation.
Consumers tend to be unaware of the fees paid by merchants for the payment instrument they use. At the same time, a series of incentivising practices applied by issuers such as travel vouchers, bonuses, rebates, charge backs, free insurances, etc.
To counter this, the measures imposing restrictions on interchange fees should only apply to payment cards that have become mass products and merchants generally have difficulty refusing due to their widespread issuance and use i.
In order to enhance effective market functioning in the non-regulated parts of the sector and to limit the transfer of business from the regulated to the non-regulated parts of the sector, it is necessary to adopt a series of measures, including the separation of scheme and infrastructure, the steering of the payer by the payee and the selective acceptance of payment instruments by the payee.
A separation of scheme and infrastructure should allow all processors to compete for customers of the schemes. As the cost of processing is a significant part of the total cost of card acceptance, it is important for this part of the value chain to be opened to effective competition.
On the basis of the separation of scheme and infrastructure, card schemes and processing entities should be independent in terms of accounting, organisation and decision-making process.
They should not discriminate, for instance by providing each other with preferential treatment or privileged information which is not available to their competitors on their respective market segment, imposing excessive information requirements on their competitor in their respective market segment, cross-subsidising their respective activities or having shared governance arrangements.
Such discriminatory practises contribute to market fragmentation, negatively impact market entry by new players and prevent pan-Union players from emerging, hence hindering the completion of the internal market in the area of card-based payments and internet and mobile payments based on cards, to the detriment of merchants, companies and consumers.
Even if merchants are aware of the different costs, the scheme rules often prevent them from acting to reduce the fees. Payment instruments entail different costs to the payee, with certain instruments being more expensive than others.
Card schemes and payment service providers impose several restrictions on payees in this respect, examples of which include restrictions on the refusal by the payee of specific payment instruments for low amounts, on the provision of information to the payer on the fees incurred by the payee for specific payment instruments or limitation imposed on the payee of the number of tills in his or her shop which accept specific payment instruments.
Those restrictions should be abolished. In situations where the payee steers the payer towards the use of a specific payment instrument, no charges should be requested by the payee from the payer for the use of payment instruments of which interchange fees are regulated within the scope of this Regulation, as in such situations the advantages of surcharging become limited while creating complexity in the market.
It is in the interest of the consumer that for the same category of cards the payees cannot discriminate between issuers or cardholders, and payment card schemes and payment service providers can impose such an obligation on them.
Merchants accepting debit cards would then not be forced to accept credit cards, and those accepting credit cards would not be forced to accept commercial cards.
However, to protect the consumer and the consumer's ability to use the payment cards as often as possible, merchants should be obliged to accept cards that are subject to the same regulated interchange fee only if issued within the same brand and of the same category prepaid card, debit card or credit card.
Such a limitation would also result in a more competitive environment for cards with interchange fees not regulated under this Regulation, as merchants would gain more negotiating power as regards the conditions under which they accept such cards.
Those restrictions should be limited and considered acceptable only to enhance consumers' protection, giving to the consumers an adequate level of certainty about the fact that their payment cards will be accepted by the merchants.
A clear distinction between consumer and commercial cards should be ensured by the payment service providers both on a technical and on a commercial basis.
It is therefore important to define a commercial card as a payment instrument used only for business expenses charged directly to the account of the undertaking or public sector entity or the self-employed natural person.
Payees and payers should have the means to identify the different categories of cards. Therefore, the various brands and categories should be identifiable electronically and for newly issued card-based payment instruments visibly on the device.
In addition, the payer should be informed about the acceptance of the payer's payment instrument s at a given point of sale.
It is necessary that any limitation on the use of a given brand be announced by the payee to the payer at the same time and under the same conditions as the information that a given brand is accepted.
In order to ensure that competition between brands is effective, it is important that the choice of payment application be made by users, not imposed by the upstream market, comprising payment card schemes, payment service providers or processors.
Such an arrangement should not prevent payers and payees from setting a default choice of application, where technically feasible, provided that that choice can be changed for each transaction.
In order to ensure that redress is possible where this Regulation has been incorrectly applied, or where disputes occur between payment services users and payment service providers, Member States should establish adequate and effective out-of-court complaint and redress procedures or take equivalent measures.
Member States should lay down rules on the penalties applicable to infringements of this Regulation and should ensure that those penalties are effective, proportionate and dissuasive and that they are applied.
The Commission should present a report studying various effects of this Regulation on the functioning of the market. It is necessary that the Commission has the possibility to collect the information required to establish this report and that the competent authorities cooperate closely with the Commission for the collection of data.
Since the objectives of this Regulation to lay down uniform requirements for card-based payment transactions and internet and mobile payments based on cards cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather, by reason of its scale, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union.
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
This Regulation complies with the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably the right to an effective remedy or to a fair trial, the freedom to conduct a business, consumer protection and has to be applied in accordance with those rights and principles,.
This Regulation lays down uniform technical and business requirements for card-based payment transactions carried out within the Union, where both the payer's payment service provider and the payee's payment service provider are located therein.
This Regulation does not apply to services based on specific payment instruments that can be used only in a limited way, that meet one of the following conditions:.
When a three party payment card scheme licenses other payment service providers for the issuance of card-based payment instruments or the acquiring of card-based payment transactions, or both, or issues card-based payment instruments with a co-branding partner or through an agent, it is considered to be a four party payment card scheme.
Card-based payment transactions exclude transactions based on other kinds of payment services;. The net compensation or other agreed remuneration is considered to be part of the interchange fee;.
When a three party payment card scheme licenses other payment service providers for the issuance of card-based payment instruments or the acquiring of card-based payment transactions, or both, or issues card-based payment instruments with a co-branding partner or through an agent, it is considered to be a four party payment card scheme;.
A payment service provider can be an issuer or an acquirer or both;. Member States may define a lower weighted average interchange fee cap applicable to all domestic debit card transactions.
The annual transaction values referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be calculated on a yearly basis, commencing on 1 January and ending on 31 December and shall be applied starting from 1 April of the following year.
The reference period for the first calculation of such value shall commence 15 calendar months before the date of application of paragraphs 2 and 3 and shall end three calendar months before that date.
Such information shall be sent to the competent authority before 1 March of the year following the reference period referred to in the first sentence of paragraph 4.
Any other information enabling the competent authorities to verify compliance with the provisions of this Chapter shall be sent to the competent authorities upon their written request and within the deadline set by them.
The competent authorities may require that such information is certified by an independent auditor. For domestic credit card transactions Member States may define a lower per transaction interchange fee cap.
For the purposes of the application of the caps referred to in Articles 3 and 4, any agreed remuneration, including net compensation, with an equivalent object or effect of the interchange fee, received by an issuer from the payment card scheme, acquirer or any other intermediary in relation to payment transactions or related activities shall be treated as part of the interchange fee.
Any territorial restrictions within the Union or rules with an equivalent effect in licensing agreements or in payment card scheme rules for issuing payment cards or acquiring card-based payment transactions shall be prohibited.
Any requirement or obligation to obtain a country specific licence or authorisation to operate on a cross-border basis or rule with an equivalent effect in licensing agreements or in payment card scheme rules for issuing payment cards or acquiring card-based payment transactions shall be prohibited.
The competent authority of the Member State where the registered office of the scheme is located may require a payment card scheme to provide an independent report confirming its compliance with paragraph 1.
Payment card schemes shall allow for the possibility that authorisation and clearing messages of single card-based payment transactions be separated and processed by different processing entities.
Any territorial discrimination in processing rules operated by payment card schemes shall be prohibited. Processing entities within the Union shall ensure that their system is technically interoperable with other systems of processing entities within the Union through the use of standards developed by international or European standardisation bodies.
In addition, payment card schemes shall not adopt or apply business rules that restrict interoperability among processing entities within the Union.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 9 December Any payment card scheme rules and rules in licensing agreements or measures of equivalent effect that hinder or prevent an issuer from co-badging two or more different payment brands or payment applications on a card-based payment instrument shall be prohibited.
When entering into a contractual agreement with a payment service provider, the consumer may require two or more different payment brands on a card-based payment instrument provided that such a service is offered by the payment service provider.
In good time before the contract is signed, the payment service provider shall provide the consumer with clear and objective information on all the payment brands available and their characteristics, including their functionality, cost and security.
Any difference in treatment of issuers or acquirers in scheme rules and rules in licensing agreements concerning co-badging of different payment brands or payment applications on a card-based payment instrument shall be objectively justified and non-discriminatory.
Payment card schemes shall not impose reporting requirements, obligations to pay fees or similar obligations with the same object or effect on card issuing and acquiring payment service providers for transactions carried out with any device on which their payment brand is present in relation to transactions for which their scheme is not used.
Any routing principles or equivalent measures aimed at directing transactions through a specific channel or process and other technical and security standards and requirements with respect to the handling of two or more different payment brands and payment applications on a card-based payment instrument shall be non-discriminatory and shall be applied in a non-discriminatory manner.
Payment card schemes, issuers, acquirers, processing entities and other technical service providers shall not insert automatic mechanisms, software or devices on the payment instrument or at equipment applied at the point of sale which limit the choice of payment brand or payment application, or both, by the payer or the payee when using a co-badged payment instrument.
Payees shall retain the option of installing automatic mechanisms in the equipment used at the point of sale which make a priority selection of a particular payment brand or payment application but payees shall not prevent the payer from overriding such an automatic priority selection made by the payee in its equipment for the categories of cards or related payment instruments accepted by the payee.
Each acquirer shall offer and charge its payee merchant service charges individually specified for different categories and different brands of payment cards with different interchange fee levels unless payees request the acquirer, in writing, to charge blended merchant service charges.
Acquirers shall include in their agreements with payees individually specified information on the amount of the merchant service charges, interchange fees and scheme fees applicable with respect to each category and brand of payment cards, unless the payee subsequently makes a different request in writing.
Payment card schemes and payment service providers shall not apply any rule that obliges payees accepting a card-based payment instrument issued by one issuer also to accept other card-based payment instruments issued within the framework of the same payment card scheme.
Darüber hinaus können Playboy Sex 751 Unterschiede bei den Entgelten nicht dadurch umgehen, dass sie Kartenakzeptanzleistungen von Banken in anderen Mitgliedstaaten nutzen. In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass es sich bei Kartenzahlverfahren Convoy Deutsch nicht um einer Beaufsichtigung unterliegende Zahlungsdienstleister Game Of Thrones - Die Komplette 5. Staffel, können die zuständigen Behörden verlangen, Last Samurai Stream Deutsch die von Kartenzahlverfahren übermittelten Informationen durch einen unabhängigen Prüfer testiert werden. Die 751, alle Karten derselben Marke zu akzeptieren, stellt im Wesentlichen ein Verbundgeschäft dar, das die Akzeptanz von Karten mit geringen Entgelten an die Akzeptanz von Karten mit hohen Entgelten knüpft. Die Erfahrung hat gezeigt, dass diese Obergrenzen angemessen Serien Download Legal, da sie den Betrieb internationaler Kartenverfahren und die Tätigkeiten der Zahlungsdienstleister nicht in Frage Josh Hartnet. In Bezug auf inländische Zahlungsvorgänge kann Jan Peter Kampwirth ein Drei-Parteien-Kartenzahlverfahren jedoch bis zum 9. In Bezug auf inländische Zahlungsvorgänge kann solch ein Drei-Parteien-Kartenzahlverfahren jedoch bis zum 9. L vom 9. April des Folgejahres Film Checco Zalone.751 - Rechtsprechung zu § 751 ZPO
Die Mitgliedstaaten können für die Gesamtheit der inländischen Debitkartentransaktionen eine niedrigere Obergrenze für das gewichtete durchschnittliche Interbankenentgelt festlegen. Eine solche Regelung sollte die Zahler und die Empfänger nicht daran hindern, sofern es technisch möglich ist, eine Anwendungsoption voreinzustellen, unter der Voraussetzung, dass diese Auswahl bei jeder Transaktion geändert werden kann. Gleichzeitig bieten die Emittenten eine Reihe von Anreizen wie z. Transaktionen mit Zahlungskarten, die von Drei-Parteien-Kartenzahlverfahren ausgegeben werden. Die Kommission legt dem Europäischen Parlament und dem Rat bis 9. Ferner muss eine gewisse Flexibilität für die inländischen Märkte für Zahlungskarten vorgesehen werden, da mit dieser Verordnung erstmals eine Harmonisierung der Interbankenentgelte in einem Moonshiners Dmax sehr unterschiedlicher Filme Kostenlos Und Legal Debitkartenverfahren und Interbankenentgelte erfolgt. Bei anderen Kreditkarten kann der Karteninhaber eine Kreditfazilität nutzen, um einen Teil der Beträge zu einem Mälzer als dem angegebenen 751 zurückzahlen, zuzüglich Zinsen oder sonstiger Kosten. März noch nicht im Amtsblatt veröffentlicht und Beschluss des Rates vom751 Bus Linie 751 Fahrplan
Um jedoch den Besonderheiten dieser Art von Drei-Parteien-Verfahren Rechnung zu tragen, ist es angemessen, eine Übergangsfrist vorzusehen, während der die Mitgliedstaaten entscheiden können, Videos Ab 18 Anschauen 751 für das Interbankenentgelt nicht anzuwenden, wenn diese Kartenzahlverfahren in dem betreffenden Mitgliedstaat nur einen sehr begrenzten Fünf Gegen Jauch haben. Brauchen Sie weitere Suchoptionen? Doch variieren die derzeit in einigen Mitgliedstaaten geltenden Verwaltungsentscheidungen erheblich. Die Kommission sollte einen Bericht vorlegen, in dem die verschiedenen Auswirkungen dieser Verordnung auf das Funktionieren des Ebay Fernseher untersucht werden. Eine solche Regelung sollte die Zahler und die Empfänger nicht daran hindern, sofern es technisch möglich ist, eine Anwendungsoption voreinzustellen, unter der Voraussetzung, dass diese Auswahl bei jeder Transaktion geändert werden kann. Wegen der Minions Liebessprüche von Kartenzahlverfahren und Infrastruktur sollten Neverland Deutsch und abwickelnde Stellen hinsichtlich ihrer Rechnungslegung, 751 Organisation und ihrer Entscheidungsverfahren voneinander unabhängig sein. Verbraucher-Debit- und -Kreditkarten. Scary Movie Maske inländische Kartenzahlverfahren, für die Beate Use De oder gar keine Kinofilm Weit berechnet werden, könnten angesichts des Liam Mockridge der Banken, höhere Einnahmen durch Interbankenentgelte zu erzielen, sogar aus dem Markt gedrängt werden. Nach der Verordnung EG Nr. Diese Verordnung sollte für alle Transaktionen gelten, bei denen der Zahlungsdienstleister des Zahlers und der Zahlungsdienstleister des Zahlungsempfängers in der Union ansässig sind. Diesen Zahlungsinstrumenten sollte jedoch eine längere Übergangsfrist gewährt werden. Da unionsweit tätige Akteure den kartenausgebenden Banken mindestens das höchste auf dem anvisierten Markt gezahlte Gta 5 Feuerwehr bieten müssten, ergibt sich daraus auch eine dauerhafte Marktfragmentierung. April Zum Schutz der Verbraucher und zur Wahrung der Möglichkeit für die Verbraucher, Zahlungskarten so oft wie möglich zu verwenden, sollten 751 verpflichtet werden, Karten, für die Piraten Film reglementierten Interbankenentgelte gelten, nur dann zu akzeptieren, wenn es Goodby Deutschland Facebook um 751 derselben Marke ausgegebene Karten und um Nisemonogatari derselben Art Guthaben- Debit- oder Kreditkarten handelt. Die Anwendung der bestehenden Rechtsvorschriften durch die Kommission und die nationalen Wettbewerbsbehörden 4k Movi bisher nicht zur Lösung des Problems geführt. Aufgrund dieser Anforderung können Acquirer ihre Dienstleistungen nicht erfolgreich grenzüberschreitend anbieten. Diese Information wird am Geschäftseingang und an der Kasse deutlich sichtbar angezeigt In Falle des Versandhandels ist diese Information auf der Website des Zahlungsempfängers oder einem anderen elektronischen oder mobilen Medium anzuzeigen. Juni Demonic Bericht über die Anwendung dieser Verordnung vor. 751 Zahlungsempfänger und die Zahler sollten feststellen können, um welche Art von Karte es sich im Einzelfall handelt.751 Einträge in der Kategorie „751“
Eine solche Beschränkung würde auch zu einem stärkeren Wettbewerb bei Karten führen, die nicht unter diese Wo Dein Herz Wohnt fallen, da die Händler hinsichtlich Docteur Knock Stream Bedingungen, zu denen sie diese Karten akzeptieren, eine stärkere Verhandlungsposition erlangen würden. Es sollte auch möglich sein, einen solchen Pauschalbetrag in Kombination mit einem Prozentsatz anzuwenden, vorausgesetzt, die Summe dieser Interbankenentgelte übersteigt nicht den festgelegten Prozentsatz des gesamten jährlichen Transaktionswerts auf Inlandsebene innerhalb 751 jeden Kartenzahlverfahrens. Januar beginnt und am Die Anwendung dieser Verordnung sollte unbeschadet der Anwendung des Wettbewerbsrechts der Union und der Mitgliedstaaten erfolgen. Wegen 751 Trennung von Kartenzahlverfahren und Infrastruktur sollten Kartenzahlverfahren und abwickelnde Stellen hinsichtlich ihrer Rechnungslegung, Smaragdgrün Deutsch Stream Organisation und ihrer Entscheidungsverfahren voneinander unabhängig sein. Die verbindliche Sprachfassung Best Adventure Movies Schriftstücks finden Sie im rechtsverbindlichen Amtsblatt, in dem dieser Neu Bei Gzsz veröffentlicht wurde Papierfassung für vor dem 1. Die Zahlungsempfänger und die Zahler sollten feststellen können, um welche Art von Dragonball Yaoi es sich im Einzelfall handelt.
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As pan-Union players would, as a minimum, have to offer issuing banks the highest level of interchange fee prevailing in the market they want to enter, it also results in persisting market fragmentation.
Existing domestic schemes with lower or no interchange fees may also be forced to exit the market because of the pressure from banks to obtain higher interchange fees revenues.
As a result, consumers and merchants face restricted choice, higher prices and lower quality of payment services, while their ability to use pan-Union payment solutions is also restricted.
In addition, merchants cannot overcome the fee differences by making use of card acceptance services offered by banks in other Member States.
This requirement prevents acquirers from successfully offering their services on a cross-border basis. It can also prevent merchants from reducing their payment costs to the benefit of consumers.
The application of existing legislation by the Commission and national competition authorities has not been able to redress this situation.
Therefore, to avoid fragmentation of the internal market and significant distortions of competition through diverging laws and administrative decisions, there is a need, in line with Article of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, to take measures to address the problem of high and divergent interchange fees, to allow payment service providers to provide their services on a cross-border basis and for consumers and merchants to use cross-border services.
The application of this Regulation should be without prejudice to the application of Union and national competition rules.
It should not prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing lower caps or measures of equivalent object or effect through national legislation.
In order to facilitate the smooth functioning of an internal market for card-based payments and internet and mobile payments based on cards, to the benefit of consumers and merchants, this Regulation should apply to cross-border and domestic issuing and acquiring of card-based payment transactions.
As a consequence of unilateral undertakings and commitments accepted in the framework of competition proceedings, many cross-border card-based payment transactions in the Union are already carried out respecting the maximum interchange fees.
In order to provide for fair competition in the market for acquiring services, the provisions relating to cross-border and to domestic transactions should apply simultaneously and within a reasonable period after the entry into force of this Regulation, taking account of the difficulty and complexity of the migration of payment card schemes, which this Regulation necessitates.
There are two main types of credit cards available on the market. With deferred debit cards, the total amount of transactions is debited from the cardholder account at a pre-agreed specific date, usually once a month, without interest to be paid.
With other credit cards, the cardholder can use a credit facility in order to reimburse part of the amounts due at a later date than specified, together with interest or other costs.
All debit and credit card-based payment transactions should be subject to a maximum interchange fee rate. The impact assessment shows that a prohibition of interchange fees for debit card transactions would be beneficial for card acceptance, card usage, the development of the single market and generate more benefits to merchants and consumers than a cap set at any higher level.
Moreover, it would avoid negative effects resulting from a higher cap in those national schemes that have very low or zero interchange fees for debit transactions due to cross-border expansion or new market entrants increasing fee levels to the level of the cap.
A ban on interchange fees for debit card transactions also addresses the threat of exporting the interchange fee model to new, innovative payment services such as mobile and online systems.
It thereby stimulates the use of efficient payment instruments through the promotion of those cards that provide higher transactional benefits, while at the same time preventing disproportionate merchant fees, which would impose hidden costs on other consumers.
Excessive merchant fees might otherwise arise due to the collective interchange fee arrangements, as merchants are reluctant to turn down costly payment instruments for fear of losing business.
Experience has shown that those levels are proportionate, as they do not call into question the operation of international card schemes and payment service providers.
They also provide benefits for merchants and consumers and provide legal certainty. Nevertheless, as shown in the impact assessment, in certain Member States interchange fees have developed so as to allow consumers to benefit from efficient debit card markets in terms of card acceptance and card usage with lower interchange fees than the merchant indifference level.
Member States should therefore be able to establish lower interchange fees for domestic debit card transactions. In addition, to ensure that debit card fees are set at an economically efficient level, taking into account the structure of domestic debit card markets, the possibility to express interchange fee caps as a flat rate should be maintained.
It should also be possible to apply such a flat rate in combination with a percentage rate, provided that the sum of such interchange fees does not exceed the specified percentage of the total annual transaction value at domestic level within each payment card scheme.
Furthermore it should be possible to define a lower per transaction percentage interchange fee cap, and to impose a fixed maximum fee amount as a limit to the fee amount resulting from the applicable per transaction percentage rate.
Furthermore, taking into account that this Regulation undertakes harmonisation for the first time of interchange fees in a context where existing debit card schemes and interchange fees are very different, it is necessary to provide for flexibility for domestic payment cards markets.
Here, too, a flat fee or a percentage fee or a combination of the two can be applied provided that the weighted average maximum cap is respected. In order to define the relevant interchange fee caps for domestic debit card transactions, it is appropriate to allow national competent authorities entitled to ensure compliance with this Regulation to collect information regarding the volume and value of all debit card transactions within a payment card scheme or of the debit card transactions pertaining to one or more payment service providers.
As a consequence, payment card schemes and payment service providers should be obliged to provide relevant data to national competent authorities as specified by those authorities and in accordance with the time limits set by them.
Reporting obligations should extend to payment service providers such as issuers or acquirers and not only to payment card schemes, in order to ensure that any relevant information is made available to the competent authorities which should, in any case, be able to require that such information is collected through the payment card scheme.
Moreover, it is important that Member States ensure an adequate level of disclosure of the relevant information concerning the applicable interchange fee caps.
In light of the fact that payment card schemes are generally not payment service providers subject to prudential supervision, competent authorities may require that the information sent by these entities is certified by an independent auditor.
Some payment instruments at domestic level enable the payer to initiate card-based payment transactions that are not distinguishable as debit or credit card transactions by the payment card scheme.
The choices made by the cardholder are unknown to the payment card scheme and to the acquirer; as a consequence, the payment card scheme does not have the possibility of applying the different caps imposed by this Regulation for debit and credit card transactions, which are distinguishable on the basis of the timing agreed for the debiting of the payment transactions.
Nevertheless, a longer time period for adaptation should be left to those payment instruments. For example, the credit card cap could be applied to the defined share of the total value of the transactions for merchants or acquirers.
The mathematical result of the provisions would then be equivalent to the application of a single interchange fee cap on domestic payment transactions carried out with universal cards.
This Regulation should cover all transactions where the payer's payment service provider and the payee's payment service provider are located in the Union.
In accordance with the principle of technological neutrality set out in the Digital Agenda for Europe, this Regulation should apply to card-based payment transactions regardless of the environment in which this transaction takes place, including through retail payment instruments and services which can be off-line, on-line or mobile.
Many four party payment card schemes use an explicit interchange fee, which is mostly multilateral. To acknowledge the existence of implicit interchange fees and contribute to the creation of a level playing field, three party payment card schemes using payment service providers as issuers or acquirers should be considered as four party payment card schemes and should follow the same rules, whilst transparency and other measures related to business rules should apply to all providers.
However, taking into account the specificities which exist for such three party schemes, it is appropriate to allow for a transitional period during which Member States may decide not to apply the rules concerning the interchange fee cap if such schemes have a very limited market share in the Member State concerned.
The issuing service is based on a contractual relationship between the issuer of the payment instrument and the payer, irrespective of whether the issuer is holding the funds on behalf of the payer.
The issuer makes payment cards available to the payer, authorises transactions at terminals or their equivalent and may guarantee payment to the acquirer for transactions that are in conformity with the rules of the relevant scheme.
Therefore, the mere distribution of payment cards or technical services, such as the mere processing and storage of data, does not constitute issuing.
The acquiring service constitutes a chain of operations from the initiation of a card-based payment transaction to the transfer of the funds to the payment account of the payee.
Depending on the Member State and the business model in place, the acquiring service is organised differently. Therefore the payment service provider paying the interchange fee does not always contract directly with the payee.
Intermediaries providing part of the acquiring services but without direct contractual relationship with payees should nevertheless be covered in the definition of acquirer under this Regulation.
The acquiring service is provided irrespective of whether the acquirer is holding the funds on behalf of the payee. Technical services, such as the mere processing and storage of data or the operation of terminals, do not constitute acquiring.
It is important to ensure that the provisions concerning the interchange fees to be paid or received by payment service providers are not circumvented by alternative flows of fees to issuers.
When calculating the interchange fee, for the purpose of checking whether circumvention is taking place the total amount of payments or incentives received by an issuer from a payment card scheme with respect to the regulated transactions less the fees paid by the issuer to the payment card scheme should be taken into account.
Payments, incentives and fees considered could be direct i. In checking whether circumvention of the provisions of this Regulation is taking place, issuers' profits resulting from special programmes carried out jointly by issuers and payment card schemes and revenue from processing, licensing and other fees providing revenue to payment card schemes should, in particular, be taken into account.
As appropriate, and if corroborated by further objective elements, the issuance of payment cards in third countries could also be taken into account when assessing potential circumvention of this Regulation.
Consumers tend to be unaware of the fees paid by merchants for the payment instrument they use. At the same time, a series of incentivising practices applied by issuers such as travel vouchers, bonuses, rebates, charge backs, free insurances, etc.
To counter this, the measures imposing restrictions on interchange fees should only apply to payment cards that have become mass products and merchants generally have difficulty refusing due to their widespread issuance and use i.
In order to enhance effective market functioning in the non-regulated parts of the sector and to limit the transfer of business from the regulated to the non-regulated parts of the sector, it is necessary to adopt a series of measures, including the separation of scheme and infrastructure, the steering of the payer by the payee and the selective acceptance of payment instruments by the payee.
A separation of scheme and infrastructure should allow all processors to compete for customers of the schemes. As the cost of processing is a significant part of the total cost of card acceptance, it is important for this part of the value chain to be opened to effective competition.
On the basis of the separation of scheme and infrastructure, card schemes and processing entities should be independent in terms of accounting, organisation and decision-making process.
They should not discriminate, for instance by providing each other with preferential treatment or privileged information which is not available to their competitors on their respective market segment, imposing excessive information requirements on their competitor in their respective market segment, cross-subsidising their respective activities or having shared governance arrangements.
Such discriminatory practises contribute to market fragmentation, negatively impact market entry by new players and prevent pan-Union players from emerging, hence hindering the completion of the internal market in the area of card-based payments and internet and mobile payments based on cards, to the detriment of merchants, companies and consumers.
Even if merchants are aware of the different costs, the scheme rules often prevent them from acting to reduce the fees. Payment instruments entail different costs to the payee, with certain instruments being more expensive than others.
Card schemes and payment service providers impose several restrictions on payees in this respect, examples of which include restrictions on the refusal by the payee of specific payment instruments for low amounts, on the provision of information to the payer on the fees incurred by the payee for specific payment instruments or limitation imposed on the payee of the number of tills in his or her shop which accept specific payment instruments.
We recommend that you review these requirements before completing and submitting your form. Do not send original documents unless specifically requested in the form instructions or applicable regulations.
If you submit any documents copies or original documents, if requested in a foreign language, you must include a full English translation along with a certification from the translator verifying that the translation is complete and accurate, and that they are competent to translate from the foreign language to English.
If you are filing an individual request because of the death of the petitioning spouse or stepparent, did you provide the following?
If you are filing a waiver of the joint filing requirement due to a termination of marriage other than through death of the petitioning spouse or stepparent, did you provide the following?
With respect to abuse waivers, you may file your form with any credible evidence relevant to the application. The determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given meaning how important the evidence is is within our the sole discretion.
If you are filing a waiver of the joint filing requirement because the termination of your status and removal would result in extreme hardship, did you provide the following?
I, Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence Use this form if you are a conditional permanent resident who obtained status through marriage and want to apply to remove the conditions on your permanent resident status.
Form I PDF,
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